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APPLYING LAWYERS' EXPERTISE TO SCIENTIFIC
EXPERTS: SOME THOUGHTS ABOUT TRIAL COURT
ANALYSIS OF THE PREJUDICIAL EFFECTS OF
ADMITTING AND EXCLUDING EXPERT SCIENTIFIC
TESTIMONY
JAMES M. DOYLE*
I. INTRODUCTION
The admissibility of expert scientific testimony is subject to a
case by case analysis by trial courts,1 which should admit the testi-
mony if it will aid the factfinding process.2 In its analysis, the court
must consider the potential detriments of admitting the testimony:
the science itself may be unreliable;3 the expert witness may con-
tribute more prejudice and confusion than information;4 and rou-
* Assistant Professor of Law and Deputy Director of the Legal Internship Program, Ge-
orgetown University Law Center. B.A. 1972, Trinity College; J.D. 1975, Northwestern Uni-
versity School of Law;, LL.M. 1978, Georgetown University Law Center.
1. 3 J. WzmsTsrN & M. BERGER, WiNsTEiN's EvIDE cE 702[02], at 702-12 (1982).
2. Federal Rule of Evidence 702 provides for admission whenever the evidence will "assist
the trier of fact." If the Federal Rules do not apply, expert testimony "within the common
knowledge of the average layman" can be excluded as unnecessary. Bridger v. Union Ry.,
355 F.2d 382, 387 (6th Cir. 1966). The latter standard has been roundly criticized on several
grounds. Weinstein and Berger point out that the standard mistakenly assumes a bright line
separating issues that are within the comprehension of jurors from those that are not. See J.
WmNsT N & M. BERGER, supra note 1, 702[02], at 702-10. Moreover, experts can offer
helpful testimony even in areas within the common knowledge of jurors. Id.; see also Ladd,
Expert Testimony, 5 VAND. L. REv. 414, 418 (1952). Perhaps the least controversial formu-
lation of an admissibility rule is Wigmore's: "On this subject can a jury receive from this
person appreciable help?" 7 J. WIGMORBE, EVIDENCE § 1923, at 29 (J. Chadbourn rev. ed.
1978). See generally McCoRIhcK's HANDBOOK OF THE LAw OF EVIDENCE § 203 (2d ed. 1972)
[hereinafter cited as McCoRMICK]; J. WENsTIN & M. BERGER, supra note 1, 702; Boyce,
Judicial Recognition of Scientific Evidence in Criminal Cases, 7 UTAH L. REy. 313 (1964);
Giannelli, The Admissibility of Novel Scientific Evidence: Frye v. United States, a Half-
Century Later, 80 CoLUM. L. REV. 1197 (1980); Strong, Questions Affecting the Admissibil-
ity of Scientific Evidence, 1970 U. ILL. L.F. 1.
3. See Giannelli, supra note 2; Tarlow, Admissibility of Polygraph Evidence in 1975: An
Aid in Determining Credibility in a Perjury-Plagued System, 26 HASTINGS L.J. 917 (1975).
4. See, e.g., United States v. Amaral, 488 F.2d 1148, 1152 (9th Cir. 1973):
The countervailing considerations most often noted to exclude what is relevant
and material evidence are the risk that admission wilh 1) require undue con-
sumption of time, 2) create a substantial danger of undue prejudice or of con-
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tine admission of expert scientific testimony on a particular subject
eventually may cause further delays in already overburdened
courts.5
The law of evidence provides a system of filters, each sensitive to
one of these detriments. If the filters work well, all helpful infor-
mation not possessing prohibitively detrimental effects is admit-
ted." The first fiter is designed to exclude what might be called
bad science-information ostensibly based on scientific techniques
which is simply wrong. The design of this filter is the subject of the
debate that continues to rage over the propriety and viability of
the tests for the admission of novel scientific evidence first set out
in Frye v. United States.' In essence, this first fiter is a device for
determining whether the scientific information is sufficiently relia-
ble to help the jury reach accurate results in a context where "the
court almost never will have sufficient personal expertise to evalu-
ate the validity"" of the scientist's conclusions.
The two remaining filters, which are the subject of this Article,
fusing the issues or of misleading the jury, 3) or unfairly and harmfully sur-
prise a party who has not had a reasonable opportunity to anticipate the
evidence submitted. Scientific or expert testimony particularly courts the sec-
ond danger because of its aura of special reliability and trustworthiness.
5. See, e.g., United States v. Thevis, 665 F.2d 616, 641 (5th Cir. 1982) ("To admit such
testimony in effect would.., open the door to a barrage of marginally relevant psychologi-
cal evidence."); Note, Did Your Eyes Deceive You? Expert Psychological Testimony on the
Unreliability of Eyewitness Identification, 29 STAN. L. REV. 969, 1027 (1977) ("Moreover,
the broader possibility that almost every contested issue of fact at every criminal trial could
elicit relevant testimony about scientific research suggests that allowing this type of evi-
dence and the inevitable rebuttal could bring courts to a standstill.").
6. See FED. R. Evm. 403 (Prejudice must "substantially outweigh" probative value).
See generally J. THAYER, A PRELImINARY TREATISE ON EVIDENCE AT THE COMMON LAW 530
(1898); 1 J. Wm STEI & M. BERGER, supra note 1, 403; Saltzburg, A Special Aspect of
Relevance: Countering Negative Inferences Associated with the Absence of Evidence, 66
CALnF. L. REv. 1011, 1013-18 (1978).
7. 293 F. 1013, 1014 (D.C. Cir. 1923). See infra text accompanying note 53. For authori-
ties debating the ramifications of the Frye test, see MCCORMICK, supra note 2, § 203, at 490;
Boyce, supra note 2, at 325; Giannelli, supra note 2; Moenssens, Polygraph Test Results
Meet Standards for Admissibility as Evidence, in LEGAL AnMIssmmrrY OF THE POLYGRAPH
14, 17 (N. Ansley ed. 1975) [hereinafter cited as Moenssens, Polygraph Test]; Moenssens,
Admissibility of Scientific Evidence-An Alternative to the Frye Rule, 25 WM. & MARY L.
REv. 545 (1984) [hereinafter cited as Moenssens, Admissibility]; Strong, supra note 2, at 11-
13.
8. J. WEimsrmi & M. BERGER, supra note 1, 1 702[03], at 702-15.
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are preeminently matters of judicial expertise.' One filter attempts
to eliminate the distorting effect that expert testimony can have at
a particular trial, and the other fiter attempts to control the dras-
tic costs that routine resort to expert testimony would entail for
the legal system. These two filters often are used in analyzing the
prejudicial effect of expert testimony, which may outweigh the tes-
timony's relevancy. Although these filters receive some attention,
they seldom draw detailed discussion from writers primarily con-
cerned with the perplexing problems of the design and administra-
tion of methods for assessing the probative value of scientific evi-
dence. The three filters overlap, and are often used simultaneously,
like color fiters attached to a lens.10 Scientific testimony fre-
quently passes without much difficulty through the first, science-
sensitive fiter, only to be excluded by the second, case-sensitive
filter." Occasionally, scientific testimony will pass through the first
two filters, only to be excluded by the third.12 This Article is con-
cerned with the effect of excluding valid scientific evidence, evi-
dence with sufficient probative value and scientific legitimacy to
pass through the first fiter.
Two propositions have dominated the restrictive treatment of
valid scientific information. The first holds that information, al-
though valid, will be misused by jurors who will be swayed by a
witness whose aura of expertise will lead them to surrender their
9. IF]actors, such as undue prejudice, confusion of issues, and waste of time, may
be associated with scientific evidence, but often these factors overlap with the
danger of misleading the jury or are of only secondary importance. Here, un-
like the assessment of the probative value of novel scientific evidence, the trial
judge appears to be on familiar turf; evaluating the misleading aspects of evi-
dence is a problem judges face in admitting or excluding nonscientific
evidence.
Giannelli, supra note 2, at 1237 (footnotes omitted). See also J. WEINSTmI & AL BuaGER,
supra note 1, 702[03], at 702-19.
10. This is, of course, a drastic simplification in an area of law where any simplification
must recognize numerous exceptions. An attempt at a more comprehensive schematic can be
found in the "flow decision chart" designed by Professor Strong. See Strong, supra note 2,
at 4-5.
11. See, e.g., United States v. Brown, 501 F.2d 146, 150 (9th Cir. 1974). See generally
cases cited infra notes 19-23.
12. Systemic prejudice seldom appears as the sole grounds for exclusion. Several opinions,
however, advert to this basis as one of the grounds for exclusion. See, e.g., United States v.
Thevis, 665 F.2d 616, 641 (5th Cir. 1982).
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own judgment."3 The second holds that the court often can dis-
pense with expert testimony because the advocate's presentation
can convey the same information. 14 In other words, exclusion of
scientific testimony does not foreclose an advocate's use of the idea
behind the testimony. Courts that have been able to apply either
proposition to a case often exclude expert testimony; courts that
have been able to apply both propositions behave as if compelled
to exclude the testimony.
In order to examine whether these propositions are valid and
validly applied, an area of expertise must be isolated within which
jurors might be tempted to surrender their own judgment. This
field of knowledge also must supply advocates with some hope of
conveying the expert's information in other ways. A number of
cases involving the psychology of perception, memory, and expres-
sion in ordinary life provide an appropriate vehicle for this exami-
nation.' The cases reveal that, in applying the second, case-sensi-
tive filter, trial judges can use a formidable array of devices to
13. See, e.g., United States v. Addison, 498 F.2d 741, 744 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (ascribing to an
expert witness "a posture of mystic infallibility in the eyes of a jury of laymen"); United
States v. Amaral, 488 F.2d 1148, 1152 (9th Cir. 1973) ("aura of special reliability and trust-
worthiness"). The phenomenon also has been referred to as "a priestly aureole." H. KALvEN,
INDENCY AND Tm SEVEN ARTS 76-77 (1930).
14. See, e.g., United States v. Amaral, 488 F.2d 1148 (9th Cir. 1973); Smith v. United
States, 389 A.2d 1356, 1359 (D.C. 1978); State v. Warren, 230 Kan. 385, 391-95, 635 P.2d
1236, 1241-43 (1981); State v. Porraro, 121 R.I. 882, 893, 404 A.2d 465, 471 (1979).
15. See, e.g., cases cited infra notes 19-23. The value of these cases as illustrative vehicles
does not derive from their being typical of scientific evidence cases. In several respects they
are atypical. For example, they usually do not involve specific propositions that are undis-
coverable by nonscientific means, as do cases dealing with chemical tests or microscopic
analysis. Cf. Strong, supra note 2, at 2. Moreover, Warren Court decisions ostensibly re-
stricting the admissibility of physical evidence and lay testimony in criminal trials have
multiplied offers of scientific proof as the prosecution works to fill the "evidence void." Gi-
annelli, supra note 2, at 1199-1200; Imwinkelried, A New Era in the Evolution of Scientific
Evidence-A Primer on Evaluating the Weight of Scientific Evidence, 23 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 261, 262 (1981). The evidence discussed here is at least as likely to be offered by the
defense as the prosecution. See, e.g., Ibn-Tamas v. United States, 407 A.2d 626 (D.C. 1979)
(expert testimony on battered women); State v. Baker, 120 N.H. 773, 424 A.2d 171 (1980)
(expert testimony offered on battered women to rebut defense claim of insanity). The dis-
tinction inverts the policy concerns of several commentators who have focused on a criminal
defendant's vulnerability to inappropriate scientific proof. See, e.g., Giannelli, supra note 2,
at 1240-45. Although this Article suggests a mode of analysis which may result in more
frequent admission of psychological evidence, it does not take a position either for or
against the admission of any particular variety of psychological testimony.
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control the use of expert testimony, although advocates often are
relatively helpless in finding any other means of conveying
equivalent information. In other words, within a particular case,
the trial process is better equipped to modulate the weight given to
the expert's findings once they have been admitted than to com-
pensate for their absence once the process has excluded them.
This conclusion prompts a further look at the systemic detri-
ments that may accrue from the wholesale admission of expert tes-
timony. Again, psychological evidence about normal perception,
memory, and expression provides a useful starting place. The na-
ture of the issues addressed by such psychological testimony as-
sures its relevancy in many cases. The cumulative effect of expert
testimony on an overburdened judicial system is a valid concern.
Analysis of this effect involves a complex of issues that is different
from-and sometimes obscured by-a case's internal relevancy
analysis, and deserves explicit consideration.
II. CONVEYING THE PSYCHOLOGY OF NORMAL LIFE
Expert psychological testimony, once received with wariness by
the courts,"6 is now commonplace.17 Indeed, courts have developed
a near dependence on psychologists if the task is "to establish the
presence or absence of mental disorders and the causal connections
between such disorders and criminal or tortious conduct."18 In re-
cent years, however, inventive lawyers have begun to press for the
admission of expert psychological testimony that may explain
processes unrelated to disorders-processes that may occur natu-
rally in everyday life.
The insights that these expert witnesses provide often challenge
intuitive understandings. For example, psychological testimony has
been offered to show that the stress of a bank robbery decreases,
rather than increases, the ability of the victims to perceive the rob-
bers,19 that a woman can fear her husband but not immediately
16. See generally Louisell, The Psychologist in Today's Legal World, 39 MN. L. REv.
236 (1955); Robbins, The Admissibility of Social Science Evidence in Person-Oriented Le-
gal Adjudication, 50 IND. L.J. 493 (1975); Comment, The Psychologist as Expert Witness:
Science in the Courtroom?, 38 MD. L. REv. 539, 544-46 (1979).
17. Comment, supra note 16, at 546-47 (criticizing psychological testimony).
18. Id. at 539-40 (footnote omitted).
19. In United States v. Amaral, 488 F.2d 1148 (9th Cir. 1973), for example, the defense
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offered the testimony of a psychologist to show that stress interferred with perception and
that the eyewitness identification process was generally unreliable.
Interest in expert testimony concerning eyewitness identifications has been growing since
the early 1970's, fueled by increasing scientific tudy in the field and by Burger Court deci-
sions which, by limiting pretrial constitutional challenges to suggestive identification proce-
dures, place the reliability of the identification process squarely before the jury. Cf. Watkins
v. Sowder, 449 U.S. 341 (1981). See generally P. WALL, EYE-WITNEss IDEN ICATION IN
CRMINAL CASES (1965); Grano, Kirby, Biggers and Ash: Do Any Constitutional Safeguards
Remain Against the Danger of Convicting the Innocent?, 72 MICH. L. REv. 717 (1974); Le-
vine & Tapp, The Psychology of Criminal Identification: The Gap from Wade to Kirby, 121
U. PA. L. REv. 1079 (1973).
The question has provoked an extraordinary amount of law review comment, much of
which follows a pattern. The commentators advert to longstanding judicial distrust of eye-
witness testimony, survey the burgeoning psychological literature supporting that mistrust,
canvass the potential solutions, and finally, support one solution or another. See, e.g., Note,
supra note 5 (preferring expert testimony); Note, Eyewitness Identification Testimony and
the Need for Cautionary Jury Instructions in Criminal Cases, 60 WASH. U.L.Q. 1387 (1983)
[hereinafter cited as Note, Eyewitness Identification Testimony] (preferring cautionary in-
structions); See generally Clifford, The Relevance of Psychological Investigation to Legal
Issues in Testimony and Identification, 1979 CRIM. L. REv. 153 (discussing relevance of
psychological evidence); Convis, Testifying About Testimony: Psychological Evidence on
Perceptual and Memory Factors Affecting the Credibility of Testimony, 21 DuQ. L. REv.
579 (1983) (endorsing expert testimony); Ellis, Davies & Shepard, Experimental Studies of
Face Identification, 3 NAT. J. Cam. DEFENSE 219 (1977); Katz & Reid, Expert Testimony
on the Fallibility of Eyewitness Identification, 1 CmM. JUST. J. 177 (1977) (preferring ex-
pert testimony); Saltzburg, supra note 6, at 1058-60 (emphasizing burdensome and problem-
atic results of expert testimony); Starkman, The Use of Eyewitness Identification Evidence
in Criminal Trials, 21 CRm. L.Q. 361 (1979) (favoring expert testimony); Comment, Does
the Eyewitness Really See., 21 WASHBURN L.J. 698 (1982) (approving use of instructions).
Dr. Loftus provides a distilled outline of the proposed psychological testimony.
When we experience an important event [a complex process occurs]. Nearly all
of the theoretical analyses of the process divide it into three stages .... First,
there is the acquisition stage-the perception of the original event-in which
information is encoded, laid down, or entered into a person's memory system.
Second, there is the retention stage, the period of time that passes between the
event and the eventual recollection of a particular piece of information. Third,
there is the retrieval stage during which a person recalls stored information.
E. Loprus, EYEwrrNEss TESTIMoNY 21 (1979).
Loftus continues by explaining that numerous factors in each stage can affect the accu-
racy and completeness of an eyewitness account. See also Note, supra note 5, at 974-89;
Note, Eyewitness Identification Testimony, supra, at 1393-96. The commentators exhaus-
tively discuss the factors but, for present purposes, it should suffice to say that an expert
can be expected to testify that the reliability of a witness suffers if exposure time is short,
events are violent, the stress is great, expectations are biased, and the events a witness is
asked to recount are peripheral rather than central. Moreover, experts can be expected to
testify that the memory of a witness decreases as the time since the event increases and that
the addition of inaccurate post-event information and feedback from other witnesses can
affect memory. See, e.g., State v. Chapple, 135 Ariz. 281, 293-94, 660 P.2d 1208, 1221 (1983).
Finally, some experts will testify that identification procedures can result in misidentifica-
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perceive leaving him as an option,20 that a defendant is not the
tions, or at least in an inappropriate degree of confidence in a difficult identification, be-
cause of the form of the questions asked, the authoritarian presence of the police, and vari-
ous other social psychological pressures inherent in the procedures. E. LoFTUs, supra, at
110; Note, supra note 5, at 985-89; Note, Eyewitness Identification Testimony, supra, at
1395 n.33; see also Buckhout & Greenwald, Witness Psychology, in ScimNTnc AND EXPERT
EVIDENCE, 1291-1327 (E. Imwinkelried 2d ed. 1981).
The psychologists testifying for criminal defendants also have expressed the belief that
jurors fail to understand the identification process and attribute an exaggerated reliability
to eyewitness testimony. Indeed, such psychological testimony and the arguments of those
who advocate the admission of the testimony is founded on a belief that jurors harbor fun-
damental misconceptions concerning this aspect of the psychology of everyday life.
20. E.g., Ibn-Tamas v. United States, 407 A.2d 626 (D.C. 1979). In Ibn-Tamas, a criminal
defendant charged with killing her husband entered a plea of self-defense and proffered the
testimony of a psychologist to show that an identifiable class of women can be characterized
as battered women, to explain why the behavior of these women varies from the lay under-
standing of normal domestic life, and to provide a basis for explaining to the jury that Ms.
Ibn-Tamas would not have perceived withdrawal as a solution to the imminent danger that
she perceived. Id. at 634.
Expert testimony on the battered woman or the battered wife has been discussed thor-
oughly in the context of self-defense claims. See, e.g., Schneider & Jordan, Representation
of Women Who Defend Themselves in Response to Physical or Sexual Assault, 4 WoMEN's
RTs. REP. 149 (1978); Note, Defense Strategies for Battered Women Who Assault Their
Mates: State v. Curry, 4 HARv. WOMEN'S L.J. 161 (1981); Note, The Use of Expert Testi-
mony in the Defense of Battered Women, 52 U. COLO. L. Rnv. 587 (1981) [hereinafter cited
as Note, The Use of Expert Testimony]; Comment, The Admissibility of Expert Testimony
on Battered Wife Syndrome: An Evidentiary Analysis, 77 Nw. U.L. REv. 348 (1982).
Battered women testimony generally portrays a cycle of violence:
[V]iolence does not constantly occur in most battering relationships, nor does
it occur randomly. Rather, there are three predictable phases: a phase of ten-
sion building, leading up to the second phase which is the acute battering inci-
dent, followed by a third phase, which is a period of loving contrition or at
least a cessation of the violent behavior.
The third phase provides positive reinforcement for women to remain in the
relationship. This periodic reinforcement provides a powerful incentive to re-
main in a battering relationship.
Walker, Thyfault & Browne, Beyond the Juror's Ken: Battered Women, 7 VT. L. Rnv. 1, 9
(1982). The expert's testimony is offered to show that various choices made by the defend-
ant wife, which might seem to jurors to contradict a claimed fear of the husband by the
wife, are a normal reaction of a woman subjected to this cycle of violence. For example, her
failure to leave her husband can be explained as the result of a psychological paralysis in-
duced by battering rather than by nonchalance. Comment, supra, at 351. Inherent in the
nature of the battering relationship is the batterer's assumption of an aura of omnipotence
and invulnerability in the eyes of the wife-defendant. This aura allows the husband to use
force at inappropriate times or of an inappropriate degree which appears fully justified in
the defendant's eyes. Note, The Use of Expert Testimony, supra, at 589. Courts have given
expert testimony on this subject a mixed reception. See, e.g., Ibn-Tamas v. United States,
407 A.2d 626 (D.C. 1979), on remand, 455 A.2d 893 (D.C. 1983) (exclusion upheld); Smith v.
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author of her taperecorded speeches,21 and that a driver approach-
ing a grade crossing would not see a freight train parked astride
it. 22 The instances multiply and probably will continue to do so as
research progresses and the psychological model for explaining and
evaluating human conduct achieves a firmer place in the legal
system.2
3
State, 247 Ga. 612, 277 S.E.2d 678 (1981) (exclusion held reversible error); State v. Anaya,
438 A.2d 892 (Me. 1981) (reversing trial court's exclusion of testimony); State v. Barker, 120
N.H. 773, 424 A.2d 171 (1980) (introduction on behalf of prosecution upheld); Buhrle v.
State, 627 P.2d 1374 (Wyo. 1981) (exclusion upheld).
21. United States v. Hearst, 412 F. Supp. 893 (N.D. Cal. 1976) (Hearst II), aff'd, 563 F.2d
1331 (9th Cir. 1977). In Hearst II, the defense offered an expert in stylistics, a branch of
psycholinguistics. This school of thought maintains that an examination of linguistic style
can reveal the author of an utterance because no two individuals will convey a message in
the same way. Comment, Stylistics Evidence in the Trial of Patricia Hearst, 1977 ARiz. ST.
L.J. 387. Other applications of linguistics evidence have been proposed. See, e.g., Arens &
Meadow, Psycholinguistics and the Confession Dilemma, 56 COLUM. L. Rav. 19 (1956);
Niblett & Boreham, Cluster Analysis in Court, 1976 CnMs. L. Rpv. 175.
22. Southern Pac. Transp. Co. v. Lueck, 111 Ariz. 560, 535 P.2d 599, afPd on reh'g, 112
Ariz. 277, 540 P.2d 1258 (1975).
The railroad crossing example fits the category of "human factors" expertise, defined by
one of its practitioners as the "study of all the factors which combine to influence the deci-
sion of the individual, such as past experience, present feelings, and immediate motor re-
sponse in terms of the present situation or environment." Note, Evidence-Expert Testi-
mony: Admissibility of Human Factors Testimony Under the Federal Rules of Evidence,
60 N.C.L. Rav. 411 (1981) (quoting Public Health Found. v. Cole, 352 So. 2d 877, 879 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1977), cert. denied, 361 So. 2d 834 (Fla. 1978)). To date, testimony of this
kind has been discussed most frequently in the context of railway-crossing and industrial
accidents. See generally Fowler, Railroad Litigation and the Human Factors Expert: Why
the Plaintiff Missed the Train, 4 Am. J. TmRAL ADvoc. 621 (1981); Fowler, Human Factors
Analysis, TRIAL, Nov.-Dec. 1974, at 53; Perman, Use of Human Factors in a Product Lia-
bility Case, 2 AM. J. Tmn ADvoc. 47 (1978).
Human factors evidence has had a mixed reception in the courtroom. See, e.g., Southern
Pac. Transp. Co. v. Lueck, 111 Ariz. 560, 535 P.2d 599 (evidence admissible), a/fd on reh'g,
112 Ariz. 277, 540 P.2d 1258 (1975); Buchman v. Seaboard Coast Line R.R., 381 So. 2d 229
(Fla. 1980) (evidence admissible); Public Health Found. v. Cole, 352 So. 2d 877 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 1977) (evidence admissible); Seaboard Coast Line R.R. v. Kubalski, 323 So. 2d 32
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1975) (exclusion proper); Olson v. A.W. Chesterton Co., 256 N.W.2d 530
(N.D. 1977) (evidence admissible); Owre v. Crown Zellerbach Corp., 260 Or. 454, 490 P.2d
504 (1971) (exclusion proper); McAdams v. Pak-Mor Mfg., 602 S.W.2d 374 (Tex. Civ. App.
1980) (evidence admissible).
23. Cf. Simon, Homo Psychologicus: Notes on a New Legal Formalism, 32 STAN. L. Rv.
487 (1980). Expert testimony concerning the psychology of eyewitness identification was of-
fered persistently before the arrival of any very hopeful precedential authority. See United
States v. Brown, 501 F.2d 146 (9th Cir. 1974); United States v. Amaral 488 F.2d 1148 (9th
Cir. 1973); People v. Bradley, 115 Cal. App. 3d 744, 171 Cal. Rptr. 487 (1981); State v.
Warren, 230 Kan. 385, 635 P.2d 1236 (Kan. 1981); State v. Barry, 25 Wash. App. 751, 611
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A jury arrives at its conclusions by applying both specific and
general propositions.24 Lay evidence sometimes will provide a spe-
cific proposition, such as that the material on the defendant's club
is blood. The common experience of the jurors then can be ex-
pected to provide the general proposition that the blood tends to
prove a battery. Scientific evidence can enter this process at either
or both levels,2 5 by detecting and typing blood where it is invisible,
or by providing a general theory of blood-typing which could elimi-
nate the putative victim as the source of the blood. Proponents of
psychological testimony concerning perception, memory, and ex-
pression argue that jurors, despite their everyday experience, often
cannot be relied on to apply correct general propositions to the
specific data adduced at trial. In fact, they warn that jurors are not
simply ignorant about general principles of everyday psychology in
the same way that they might be ignorant of the Doppler shift
principle for the measurement of speed, but that jurors often har-
bor serious misconceptions which, if applied as general principles,
greatly endanger the accuracy of the factfinding process.26
If jurors do harbor such misconceptions, the law of evidence
should not perpetuate them unnecessarily.2 7 The question becomes
whether expert testimony addressing these questioned general pro-
positions is the best, or even an acceptable, means of dispelling the
misconceptions.
P.2d 1262 (1980). State v. Chapple, 135 Ariz. 281, 660 P.2d 1208 (1983), is the first decision
finding an abuse of discretion in the trial court's exclusion of expert testimony on the psy-
chology of eyewitness identification.
24. McCoRMcIK, supra note 2, § 203; Strong, supra note 2, at 2-4.
25. McCoRMCK, supra note 2, § 206, refers to the variety of specific scientific techniques
that have been used to uncover otherwise undetectable evidence, and catalogues some of the
burgeoning literature in specialized fields. A good illustrative case is United States v. Stifel,
433 F.2d 431 (6th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 994 (1971). In Stifel, the United States
Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit discussed at length the means by which the neutron
activation analysis technique generates new data, and the general principles by which that
data can be used to identify the source of particular materials.
26. See, e.g., Deffenbacher & Loftus, Do Jurors Share a Common Understanding Con-
cerning Eyewitness Behavior?, 6 LAw & HuM. BmLHv. 15 (1982); Loftus, Psychological As-
pects of Courtroom Testimony, in 347 ANNALs, N.Y. AcAD. Scl. 27 (1980); Walker, Thyfault
& Browne, supra note 20; Note, supra note 5, at 970-73 nn.7-9.
27. FED. R. Evm. 402; 1 J. WIGMORs, supra note 2, §§ 9, 10 (3d ed. 1940). See also FED.
R. Evm. 403.
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HI. TRIAL COURT ANALYSIS
The burden of deciding whether expert testimony is the best
method to dispel misconceptions falls, with force, on trial courts.
Broad general rules are available for trial judges confronted with
an offer of expert psychological testimony. On the surface, these
rules appear to be fairly straightforward. For example, rule 702 of
the Federal Rules of Evidence states: "If scientific, technical, or
other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to under-
stand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness quali-
fied as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or edu-
cation, may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise."
Although some controversy lingers over the content of these gen-
eral rules, the real difficulties arise in applying general principles,
such as those of rule 702, to specific cases. A resort to appellate
decisions is not helpful to the judge or advocate who must apply
these principles to the expert testimony of a psychologist. This is
due in part to appellate application of the abuse of discretion stan-
dard, in part to some confusing properties of the appellate opin-
ions themselves, but mainly to the ad hoc nature of all relevancy
decisions.
Federal and state courts adhere to the rule recognized in Salem
v. United States Lines28 that "[t]he trial judge has broad discre-
tion in the matter of the admission or exclusion of expert evidence,
and his action is to be sustained unless manifestly erroneous."
Whatever comfort it may provide an apprehensive trial judge who
fears reversal, however, the abuse of discretion standard contrib-
utes to a tendency in appellate courts to refrain from detailed com-
ment on proffered expert testimony. Frequently, the appellate
court will go to considerable length to disclaim an intention to
comment on the merits of the issue: "This is not to say that admis-
sion of such testimony would have been improper. At a new trial,
admission . .. will again be within the discretion of the trial
court. ' 29 As a result, the opinions provide some guidance in ex-
treme situations where evidence must or must not be admitted,
but are less helpful in the broad range of cases in which either
28. 370 U.S. 31, 35 (1962). See generally J. WmNsTEN & M. BERGER, supra note 1,
702[02J; 2 J. WIGMORE, supra note 2, § 561 (J. Chadbourn rev. ed. 1979).
29. United States v. Benveniste, 564 F.2d 335, 339 n.3 (9th Cir. 1977).
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course is permissible.
Appellate opinions are also somewhat unwieldy because of the
bewildering thicket of overlapping legal principles that apply to
the question of admissibility of expert scientific testimony. In re-
viewing a trial judge's exclusion of psychological testimony con-
cerning battered women, for example, the District of Columbia
Court of Appeals considered whether the proffered evidence in-
vaded the province of the jury, was within the ken of the average
layman, allowed the expert to decide the case in place of the jurors,
was proposed by an expert qualified in her field, was offered by an
expert in a field that permits the assertion of a reasonable opinion,
and was of sufficient probative value to outweigh any potential
prejudicial impact.30
The admission of expert evidence is an area in which obsolete, or
at least obsolescent, terms and tests have shown a remarkable abil-
ity to survive and to penetrate appellate opinions. Moreover, ap-
pellate courts upholding the exclusion of expert evidence seldom
confine themselves to a single justification; the phrase, "and fur-
thermore," seems to echo throughout the opinions. The United
States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit demonstrated this
tendency in United States v. Foshers when it upheld the exclu-
sion of expert psychological testimony on eyewitness identifica-
tions because it did not assist the trier of fact,32 was not relevant, 33
would have confused the jury," would have consumed an inordi-
nate amount of time,35 was not based on a generally accepted body
of scientific knowledge, 6 and was adequately replaced by cross-ex-
amination. 7 The court did not indicate whether each of these
grounds alone would have been sufficient to exclude the expert
testimony.
The need for conscientious trial court analysis is enhanced by
30. Ibn-Tamas v. United States, 407 A.2d 626, 632-35 (D.C. 1979), on remand, 455 A.2d
893 (1983).
31. 590 F.2d 381 (1st Cir. 1979).
32. Id. at 383.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 383-84.
36. Id. at 383.
37. Id. at 382.
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these factors, of course, but it probably arises from the nature of
the task itself. A review of the caselaw reveals that the division
between questions concerning threshold admissibility and ques-
tions concerning the weight given to evidence is not applied in its
familiar fashion when scientific evidence is at issue. Courts seldom
resolve the question of its admissibility without implicitly deter-
mining the weight that the evidence deserves and predicting the
weight that the jurors will give it. If the predicted weight seems
inappropriate, probative scientific evidence often is excluded."
The question framed by one court qualifying its own liberal ap-
proach to admissibility was whether "an exaggerated popular opin-
ion of the accuracy of a particular technique makes its use prejudi-
cial or likely to mislead the jury." 9
IV. DETERMINING THE WEIGHT THAT THE EVIDENCE DESERVES
The two principal tests for the admissibility of scientific evi-
dence are genuinely different. The traditional test of Frye v.
United States40 is more restrictive than the McCormick relevancy
test.41 Proponents of the Frye test generally place less trust in the
jurors' ability to weigh scientific evidence. 42 The two tests, how-
ever, have some similarities. Both tests involve primarily"3 a deter-
38. [IThe courts, when undertaking to pass on the question whether the evidence
has sufficient probative value to assist the jury, mix that question with the one
of effect on the jury, and seemingly require that the probative value be as great
as the courts decide the jury will think it to be. In the case of matters labelled
"lie-detector," "truth-serum," "voiceprint," or "mathematical certainty," the
courts seem to conclude that the jury will consider the tests infallible, and so
require that they be shown to be infallible before they are admitted.
McCORMICK, supra note 2, § 203, at 490 n.32 (citations omitted).
39. United States v. Bailer, 519 F.2d 463, 466 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1019
(1975).
40. 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
41. See McCORMIcK, supra note 2, § 203, at 491 ("Any relevant conclusions which are
supported by a qualified expert witness should be received unless there are other reasons for
exclusion. Particularly, probative value may be overborne by the familiar dangers of preju-
dicing or misleading the jury, and undue consumption of time.") (footnotes omitted). See
generally Giannelli, supra note 2, at 1223-24.
42. See Imwinkelried, The Standard for Admitting Scientific Evidence: A Critique from
the Perspective of Juror Psychology, 28 Vn.. L. Rv. 554, 563 (1983) ("The judicial skepti-
cism of jurors' ability to evaluate the evidence is deep-seated, with courts often relying on
that skepticism as a rationale for the Frye test.") (citations omitted).
43. Each test also embraces secondary concerns. Through its general acceptance standard,
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mination of the reliability and the validity of scientific information
developed in fields in which judges have no personal expertise.
Both tests rely on the same sources of information in arriving at a
determination and both create, as a necessary by-product of the
decisional process, a sense of the appropriate weight that the prof-
fered scientific evidence deserves.
Various types of scientific evidence have been recognized as suf-
ficiently reliable to warrant a presumption of probative value.
Courts have taken judicial notice of the principles "underlying ra-
dar, intoxication tests, fingerprints, firearms identifications, and
handwriting comparisons."' 44 As one writer notes, "[iln some cases,
the validity of a technique-radar and intoxication tests are the
principal examples-has been recognized legislatively. ' 45 This rec-
ognition relieves the proponent of the burden of proving the valid-
ity and reliability of the scientific methods; in effect, it recognizes
the logical relevancy of the scientific information and reserves only
legal relevancy questions, such as prejudice.46
Certain factfinding areas are so dependent on expert testimony
that, as Judge Weinstein and Professor Berger note, "the plaintiff
loses if he fails to sustain the burden of coming forward with ex-
pert evidence.' 47 In these areas, such as medical malpractice, a
trial court can determine admissibility by resorting to precedent. If
all questions of logical relevance and the acceptability of counter-
the Frye test ensures that a "reserve of experts" will be available to help forestall abuse of
any probative value that the evidence possesses. See People v. Kelly, 17 Cal. 3d 24, 31, 549
P.2d 1240, 1244-45, 130 Cal. Rptr. 144, 148-49 (1976). Either test can deal with these con-
cerns, but "[i]t is predominately on the basis of [the] reliability argument that the Frye test
must be judged." Giannelli, supra note 2, at 1207. See also J. WmNsTEiN & M. BEaGER,
supra note 1, 1 702[03].
44. Giannelli, supra note 2, at 1203 (footnotes omitted).
45. Id. See also J. WEINSTEN & M. BERGER, supra note 1, 702[03], at 702-15 ("When
the proffered opinion evidence relates to a topic which has been judicially recognized as a
proper subject for expert testimony, the court need only consider whether this evidence will
aid the jury in deciding the particular issues in the case."); Strong, supra note 2, at 6-9
(discussing the controversy over the standard for judicial notice of scientific evidence). See
generally Davis, Judicial Notice, 55 COLUM. L. REv. 945 (1955).
46. The familiar, yet much criticized, shorthand of legal and logical relevancy is a conve-
nience here; however, it could well contribute to further confusion elsewhere. See McCoR-
roCK, supra note 2, § 185, at 441; 1 J. WIGMORE, supra note 2, § 12 (3d ed. 1940).
47. J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, supra note 1, 702[02], at 702-09 (footnotes omitted).
See generally Ladd, supra note 2; Comment, Medical Malpractice-Expert Testimony 60
Nw. U.L. Rv. 834 (1966).
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vailing detriments are resolved, then the court should admit the
evidence. Different problems confront courts when the scientific
evidence is novel.
The admissibility test applied by a court" will shape to some
extent the judicial determination of the weight that the scientific
evidence deserves. The choice between tests continues to be dis-
cussed,49 and dissatisfaction with the existing alternatives is grow-
ing, rather than abating.50 For present purposes, it is enough to
sketch the two principle approaches derived from Frye v. United
States and the relevancy approach usually associated with Profes-
sor McCormick.51
In Frye, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit upheld the exclusion of evidence derived from a
forerunner of the modern polygraph, and promulgated its influen-
tial test 52 for the admissibility of novel scientific evidence:
Just when a scientific principle or discovery crosses the line be-
tween the experimental and demonstrable stages is difficult to
define. Somewhere in this twilight zone the evidential force of
the principle must be recognized, and while courts will go a long
way in admitting expert testimony deduced from a well-recog-
nized scientific principle or discovery, the thing from which the
deduction is made must be sufficiently established to have
gained general acceptance in the particular field in which it
belongs.5"
The test has survived despite an onslaught of almost savage
criticism.54
Numerous critics have pointed 'out the difficulties of applying
the Frye test. Not the least of these difficulties is knowing whether
48. See supra notes 40-41 and accompanying text.
49. See Moenssens, Admissibility, supra note 7. See generally Decker & Handler,
Voiceprint Identification Evidence-Out of the Frye Pan and into Admissibility, 26 AM.
U.L. REv. 314 (1977).
50. See, e.g., Giannelli, supra note 2, at 1250.
51. See 293 F. 1013, 1014 (D.C. Cir. 1923); MCCORMICK, supra note 2, § 203, at 491.
52. Imwinkelried, supra note 15, at 264 ("Until very recently, Frye was the almost univer-
sal view among American courts.").
53. 293 F. at 1014. See generally Giannelli, supra note 2, at 1204-18.
54. Giannelli, supra note 2, at 1219; see also MCCORMICK, supra note 2, § 203, at 490;
Boyce, supra note 2, at 325; Strong, supra note 2, at 11-13.
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to apply Frye at all . 5 The Frye test also leaves open the difficult
determination of who must accept the scientific procedure. Partic-
ularly in interdisciplinary areas, identification of the appropriate
field of expertise for general acceptance is difficult. General accept-
ance itself is a standard subject to various interpretations." More-
over, commentators question "whether the Frye standard requires
general acceptance of the scientific technique or of both the under-
lying principle and the technique applying it. '57
Proponents of the Frye test have responded that the general ac-
ceptance standard assures the existence of "a minimal reserve of
experts... who can critically examine the validity of a scientific
determination in a particular case."58 The root of the Frye stan-
dard's justification is that the scientific community most qualified
to assess the reliability of scientific information will make the deci-
sion. In the eyes of its supporters, the Frye rule provides a neces-
sary bulwark against the situation, allegedly created by the McCor-
mick approach, in which "the court will generally be forced to
accept the probative value of the evidence as what a qualified ex-
pert testifies it to be."59
A lively debate continues over the viability of the Frye test in
the face of the Federal Rules of Evidence. 0 Some jurisdictions
have explicitly abolished the Frye standard through their common
55. See Giannelli, supra note 2, at 1208-09. The author cites the view of Professor Moen-
ssens that
[d]eciding what is the proper field to which a novel test belongs is in itself a
chore. Most novel tests represent new approaches to the solution of old
problems by a process which is unknown, or belongs to a different field. Be-
cause of this, the person developing a novel test frequently finds himself on the
fringes of his scientific discipline, and perhaps overlapping into other
disciplines.
Moenssens, Polygraph Test, supra note 7, at 17.
56. See, e.g., Kirk, The Interrelationship of Law and Science, 13 BUFFALO L. Rav. 393
(1964).
57. Giannelli, supra note 2, at 1211 (footnotes omitted).
58. United States v. Addison, 498 F.2d 741, 744 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
59. Strong, supra note 2, at 22.
60. Compare J. WEINSTEM & M. BERGER, supra note 1, 702[03], at 702-16 ("The silence
of the rule and its drafters should be regarded as tantamount to an abandonment of the
general acceptance standard."), with Giannelli, supra note 2, at 1229 ("[It can be argued
that because Frye was the established rule and no statement repudiating Frye appears in
the legislative history, the general acceptance standard remains intact.") (footnotes
omitted).
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law powers.6 1 Even where the McCormick relevancy approach has
replaced the Frye standard, however, the criteria of the Frye test
remain significant. General acceptance, although downplayed as
the sine qua non of admissibility, is still considered. "A technique
unable to garner any support, or only miniscule support, within
the scientific community, would be found unreliable by a court,
'8 2
even under the McCormick approach. Conversely, although the
McCormick approach is more dependent on the qualifications of
the testifying expert, a determination under the Frye test also im-
plicates the expert's qualifications.63
The differences between the tests will affect the specific types of
evidence admitted. Although literal application of the Frye stan-
dard will exclude some evidence because of the test's built in "cul-
tural lag," the McCormick test, unhampered by the general accept-
ance standard, will admit the same evidence." The Frye test also
ordinarily will vary the emphasis given to a particular criterion;
general acceptance will receive less attention when other detrimen-
tal factors are present.
Under any test, trial judges are forced to gauge the weight that
the scientific evidence deserves without personal scientific exper-
tise. The trial judge also will arrive at an assessment of the weight
the evidence deserves based on information derived from the same
sources; the choice of a test does not change the available sources
of information. Scientific and legal literature are useful either in
determining general acceptance or in informing the court about
probative value.6 5 Judicial opinions can be consulted for guid-
ance.66 Finally, under any approach, testimony from expert wit-
nesses offered to support admission or exclusion of particular evi-
dence inevitably will contribute to an opinion regarding the
appropriate weight.
61. See, e.g., State v. Williams, 388 A.2d 500 (Me. 1978); see also Romero, The Admissi-
bility of Scientific Evidence Under the New Mexico and Federal Rules of Evidence, 6 N.M.
L. REv. 187 (1976).
62. United States v. Williams, 583 F.2d 1194, 1198 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S.
1117 (1979).
63. See, e.g., Giannelli, supra note 2, at 1215-16.
64. Id. at 1217.
65. Id. at 1217-18.
66. Id. at 1218-19; see also Strong, supra note 2, at 14.
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Advocates will present these sources of information as part of
the adversary process. Professor Imwinkelried has pointed out the
reluctance of lawyers to attack the weight of scientific evidence af-
ter it has been admitted against them. The reasons behind this
reluctance, however, should not contribute to any similar demure-
ness in debating the weight of evidence in the context of admissi-
bility determinations. Admissibility is determined outside the pres-
ence of the jury,68 and the fear of reinforcing the expert's
testimony before the jurors is one of the factors that discourages
concerted attacks on the weight of scientific evidence once it is ad-
mitted. Indeed, the prevailing sense of impotence 9 in the face of
admissible scientific evidence ought to promote a tendency among
trial lawyers to do their best to exclude the evidence altogether by
contributing helpful information gathered from these sources dur-
ing the admissibility decisionmaking process.70
V. PREDICTING THE WEIGHT THAT THE EVIDENCE WILL RECEIVE
A workable notion of the weight that particular evidence de-
serves can be derived from expert testimony, scientific literature,
legal literature, and judicial opinions. The discretionary decision to
admit the evidence, however, requires a prediction that the trier of
fact will not use the evidence inappropriately. The trial judge can-
not make that prediction intelligently without first anticipating the
likely effects of a chain of discretionary decisions concerning the
use of the evidence at trial. The trial court's analysis must concen-
trate on the scope and content of the voir dire, the examination of
witnesses, the arguments of counsel, and the instructions to the
jury.
By focusing on these factors, the trial court can answer two
questions: first, whether the adversary process will modulate the
weight that the jury will give to the expert testimony and prevent
undue influence due to the aura of expertise; and second, whether
the adversary process permits counsel to convey the scientific in-
formation through alternative techniques that preserve the idea
67. Imwinkelried, supra note 15, at 272.
68. See FD. R. Evw. 104.
69. See Imwinkelried, supra note 15, at 272-73.
70. Imwinkelried, supra note 42, at 562.
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behind the evidence while ensuring that jurors will grant the infor-
mation appropriate weight.
A. The Aura of Expertise
Courts dislike the aura of special reliability and trustworthiness
that surrounds expert testimony. The courts fear that jurors will
give undue weight to information conveyed by scientific experts
because of the means of its conveyance. 1 Whether the aura exists,
however, is open to question. One authority has noted that "the
clear weight of the available hard data calls into question the as-
sumption underlying Frye, namely, that scientific testimony over-
whelms the typical lay juror. '7 2 Although the issue has to be con-
sidered unresolved, jurors apparently are willing to rely on their
own ideas even if contradicted by expert testimony.73
Jurors are adept at disposing of information with which they dis-
agree.74 They can remember the parts of a statement that they
wish to hear, and can distort the parts of the statement with which
they disagree. Finally, they can recall selectively those parts of a
statement that support their own views.75 Jurors may use all three
tactics in areas of testimony in which they are likely to hold views
contrary to those provided by the expert. For example, if jurors
believe that a woman who anticipated violence from her husband
would simply leave, they might not suspend automatically their or-
dinary human reactions to inconsistent information in favor of
someone holding a doctoral degree in psychology.
Assuming, for the sake of argument, that jurors will have some
tendency to defer to a scientific expert,76 the belief that they will
defer to different experts equally is difficult to sustain. Limited
71. See, e.g., United States v. Amaral, 488 F.2d 1148, 1152 (9th Cir. 1973).
72. Imwinkelried, supra note 42, at 570.
73. MCCORMICK, supra note 2, § 211, at 521-22 nn.95-97.
74. Cf. Austin, Jury Perceptions on Advocacy: A Case Study, LITIGATION, Summer 1982,
at 15, 16-17 (discussing jurors' skepticism of expert witnesses); Bettinghaus, Cognitive Bal-
ance and the Development of Meaning, 13 J. COM. 94 (1963) (experimentally demonstrating
the tendency to reconcile or reject inconsistent information).
75. See McGaffey, A Realistic Look at Expert Witnesses in Obscenity Cases, 69 Nw.
U.L. Rsv. 218, 229-31 (1974).
76. Cf. Imwinkelried, supra note 42, at 556-70. Professor Imwinkelried discusses at some
length the available evidence concerning juror deference to experts, and finds little support
in the published data for the existence of the phenomenon. Id. at 570-71.
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empirical research supports the argument that jurors are willing to
trust their own knowledge. In the context of the psychology of eve-
ryday life, the jurors' knowledge must be assumed: "[M]ost jurors
probably consider themselves better amateur psychologists than
amateur physicians, chemists, or metallurgists. They are likely to
be less swayed by testimony about perception and memory than by
testimony about cervical discs .... Trial courts offered scientif-
ically valid information cannot exclude the evidence merely be-
cause it is scientific without at least attempting to assess the actual
extent of the aura of expertise surrounding the information.
The absence of conclusive studies of juror psychology should not
obscure the availability of another line of inquiry that courts are
well suited to undertake. If the court can control, or if opposing
counsel can attack, expert testimony through readily available trial
tools, then the risk of jury confusion or prejudice can be mini-
mized. Professor Saltzburg has noted "that the adversary system is
largely based on exposure of weaknesses in witnesses, testimony,
and physical evidence through cross-examination, impeachment,
and counter-evidence. Evidence not attacked is evidence readily
accepted.178 These means for controlling and limiting the effect of
expert testimony must play a part in the trial court's analysis. If
the tools cannot be applied on a practical level, then the inability
to control or attack the aura of expertise justifies the exclusion of
potentially misleading scientific information. If, on the other hand,
counsel is provided with the tools for vigorously probing the ex-
pert's testimony, then the court can guard against the aura of
expertise.
B. Controlling the Aura of Expertise: The Trial Judge's Controls
The trial judge has the threshold responsibility for ensuring that
the expert called to testify is more than a mannequin dressed in
professional degrees and honors. Under any test of probative value,
the expert witness must have "sufficient skill, knowledge, or expe-
rience in that field or calling as to make it appear that his opinion
or inference will probably aid the trier in his search for the
77. Convis, supra note 19, at 584.
78. Saltzburg, supra note 6, at 1058.
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truth. 79 In considering the effect of the aura of expertise emanat-
ing from valid scientific testimony, only an exaggerated regard for
a witness' opinions is of concern, not spurious expertise.
Wigmore's formulation of the problem is also worth recalling:
"On this subject can a jury from this person receive appreciable
help?" 80 Wigmore's question is a reminder of the trial judge's
power to direct the expert's testimony toward a limited subject. An
expert in the psychology of normal life could testify about several
subjects. The psychologist called by the defense in Ibn-Tamas v.
United States, l for example, offered to describe the phenomenon
of wife-battering, and to give her opinion of the extent to which
the defendant's behavior corresponded with battered women that
she had studied.8 2 Similarly, psychologists called to challenge the
reliability of eyewitness identifications could deliver a general lec-
ture concerning the nature of human perception, memory, and ex-
pression, 8 comment on specific factors, such as stress, that are pre-
sent in the particular case,84 or express an opinion concerning the
reliability of a particular witness.8 5
The trial judge's power to choose among these subjects can be
considered a derivative of his power to control the form of testi-
79. MCCORMICK, supra note 2, § 13. See also FED. R. EvIn. 702; J. WIGMORE, supra note
2, § 1923. The question of the expert's qualifications is within the discretion of the trial
court. See FED. R. Evw. 104(a); Soo Line R.R. v. Fruehauf Corp., 547 F.2d 1365, 1374 (8th
Cir. 1977); J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, supra note 1, 702[04].
80. J. WIGMORE, supra note 2, § 1923.
81. 407 A.2d 626 (D.C. 1979).
82. Id. at 631.
83. But see State v. Griffin, 626 P.2d 478, 481 (Utah 1981).
84. See State v. Chapple, 135 Ariz. 281, 295-96, 660 P.2d 1208, 1223-24 (1983). The Advi-
sory Committee's notes to rule 702 of the Federal Rules of Evidence point out:
Most of the literature assumes that experts testify only in the form of opinions.
The assumption is logically unfounded. The rule accordingly recognizes that an
expert on the stand may give a dissertation or exposition of scientific or other
principles relevant to the case, leaving the trier of fact to apply them to the
facts. Since much of the criticism of expert testimony has centered upon the
hypothetical question, it seems wise to recognize that opinions are not indis-
pensable and to encourage the use of expert testimony in nonopinion form
when counsel believes the trier can itself draw the requisite inference.
FED. R. Evm. 702 advisory cbmmittee note. See generally J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, supra
note 1, 702[05]; Note, The Expert as Educator: A Proposed Approach to the Use of Bat-
tered Woman Syndrome Expert Testimony, 35 VAND. L. REv. 741 (1982).
85. Cf. Fan. R. Evm. 702-704.
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mony, or as part of his general power to control the scope of direct
examination. The trial judge has ample power to limit expert testi-
mony to specific data or general propositions. Even after the enact-
ment of rule 704 of the Federal Rules of Evidence, which abolished
the ultimate issue rule,86 courts have shown a heightened sensitiv-
ity to the prejudicial effect of expert testimony if the subject mat-
ter of that testimony relates closely to the ultimate issue. 7 That
understandable wariness, however, should not obscure the fact that
the trial judge may permit the expert to testify on some limited
subjects even if the expert cannot safely be permitted to testify on
every question for which his testimony is offered.
The trial judge also must instruct the jury on the use of expert
testimony.88 Jury instructions are a potentially powerful tool for
dispelling the aura of expertise and for reminding the jurors of
their responsibility as ultimate triers of facts. Whether instructions
can accomplish these goals is a question that can be answered only
provisionally until authoritative empirical research appears.8 Even
then, a comparison of the efficacy of different instructions directed
at different topics of expert testimony will be necessary. Neverthe-
less, a number of factors suggest that jurors will respond to cau-
tionary instructions. Jurors are predisposed to trust their own
judgment,90 and an instruction designed to encourage them to do
so should find a receptive audience. Instructions of this kind can
be drafted clearly, with none of the problems encountered with in-
structions on concepts such as reasonable doubt or the presump-
tion of innocence.9 1 Although the instructions will include some
comment on the weight to be given to expert testimony, they are
86. "Testimony in the form of an opinion or inference otherwise admissible is not objec-
tionable because it embraces an ultimate issue to be decided by the trier of fact." FED. R.
Evin. 704. See also MCCORMXCK, supra note 2, § 12.
87. See Strong, supra note 2, at 13.
88. See generally J. WmiNsTEIN & M. BERGER, supra note 1, 1 702[03], at 702-20.
89. As one author has noted, the empirical literature concerning the efficacy of limiting
instructions is surprisingly scarce. Haddad, Post-Bruton Developments: A Reconsideration
of the Confrontation Rationale, and a Proposal for a Due Process Evaluation of Limiting
Instructions, 18 AM. Cram. L. REv. 1, 40-41 (1980). See generally Severance & Loftus, Im-
proving the Ability of Jurors to Comprehend and Apply Criminal Jury Instructions, 17
LAw & Soc'y Rav. 153 (1982).
90. See supra notes 72-77 and accompanying text.
91. See Severance & Loftus, supra note 89, at 185-86.
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more likely to be heeded than instructions that ask jurors to ignore
relevant evidence because the primary thrust of cautionary in-
structions is toward apportioning the roles of expert and juror.92
Carefully drafted instructions will assist jurors in evaluating expert
testimony. The jurors' willingness to undertake this task, however,
can evaporate quickly if the jurors are not given the means to per-
form it.
The trial judge's influence on the jurors' ability to perform the
evaluation function will be felt most strongly in his control of op-
posing counsel. The means and extent of the adversarial challenge
to the expert's testimony are matters for trial court discretion. Ju-
dicial anticipation of the extent to which opposing counsel will at-
tack expert testimony is an integral part of predicting the weight
that the scientific evidence will receive.
C. Controlling the Aura of Expertise: Adversary Attack
Ironically, the expert scientific witness, characterized in judicial
opinions as the invulnerable magician, Merlin,93 often appears in
the memoirs of legendary trial lawyers exposed as either Rube
Goldberg, fabricating ever more fantastic devices, or Dr. Pangloss,
pompously offering increasingly inane opinions.9 4 Both sides un-
92. See, e.g., 2 E. DEvrrr & C. BLAcKMAR, FEDERAL JURY PRACTICE AND INSTRUCTIONS (3d
ed. 1977).
The rules of evidence ordinarily do not permit witnesses to testify as to opin-
ions or conclusions. An exception to this rule exists as to those whom we call
"expert witnesses". Witnesses who, by education and experience, have become
expert in some art, science, profession, or calling, may state their opinions as to
relevant and material matter, in which they profess to be expert, and may also
state their reasons for the opinion.
You should consider each expert opinion received in evidence in this case,
and give it such weight as you may think it deserves. If you should decide that
the opinion of an expert witness is not based upon sufficient education and
experience, or if you should conclude that the reasons given in support of the
opinion are not sound or if you feel that it is outweighed by other evidence,
you may disregard the opinion entirely.
Id. § 72.07. But cf. Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123 (1968) (an instruction to disregard
a defendant's confession in deciding the codefendant's case violates the confrontation clause
of the sixth amendment). See generally Haddad, supra note 89, at 40-42.
93. See, e.g., People v. Collins, 68 Cal. 2d 319, 320, 438 P.2d 33, 66 Cal. Rptr. 497 (1968)
(mathematical expert takes on role of "a veritable sorcerer" who "casts a spell" over jurors).
94. See, e.g., E. GERTE, A HANDiUL OF CLIENTS 277-78 (1976) (recounting a five-page effort
by opposing counsel to extract a comprehensible statement from an expert witness); G.
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doubtedly overstate the case, but most observers would agree that
experts have a number of vulnerabilities. 95
The most obvious vulnerability involves the spectre of opposing
expert witnesses with similar credentials who hold conflicting
views. If Dr. Loftus testifies that stress adversely affects perception
in identification cases and Dr. McCloskey testifies that it does not,
the probable result is a neutralized expert witness.96 Modern inter-
pretations of the learned treatise rule give trial judges the discre-
tion to facilitate this sort of challenge to expert testimony without
the presence of an army of psychologists. If the expert's opinion
has been contradicted in scientific literature, the existence of the
contradiction can be brought before the jury.9 7 In such a situation,
the jurors nevertheless may choose to believe the expert witness,
but they will not believe him solely because of his aura of
expertise.
Moreover, in situations involving the psychology of normal life,
the expert ordinarily will be at a disadvantage in comparison to lay
eyewitnesses."" Very few identification cases will go to trial without
SPENCE & A. POLK, GUNNING FOR JUSTICE 80 (1982) (medical expert mistakes leg for arm); F.
WELLmAN, LUCK AND OPPoRTUNrry 43-44 (1938) (expert testimony based on the expert's
knowledge of a case in which decedent's pupils were not symmetrically contracted; the dece-
dent wore a glass eye).
95. This discussion leaves aside the widely held intuitive belief that the types of people
who become experts are the types of people who will have difficulty communicating with
jurors. See generally McGaffey, The Expert Witness and Source Credibility-The Commu-
nication Perspective, 2 AM. J. TRIAL ADvoc. 57, 60 (1978). Although anecdotal evidence
cannot be conclusive, experts may not be any less likely than lay people to suffer from the
barriers that psychologists believe jurors erect against witnesses from different social classes.
96. Convis, supra note 19, at 584.
97. See generally MCCORMICK, supra note 2, § 321; J. WIGMORE, supra note 2, §§ 1690-
1708. Wigmore advocates a broad hearsay exception for learned treatises. Most current for-
mulations are less liberal. For example, the Federal Rules of Evidence provide a hearsay
exception
[t]o the extent called to the attention of an expert witness upon cross-examina-
tion or relied upon by him in direct examination, [for] statements contained in
published treatises, periodicals, or pamphlets on a subject of history, medicine,
or other science or art, established as a reliable authority by the testimony or
admission of the witness or by other expert testimony or by judicial notice.
FED. R. Evm. 803(18). However, as McCormick notes, "[v]irtually all courts do, to some
extent, permit the use of learned materials in the cross-examination of an expert witness."
MCCORMICK, supra note 2, § 321, at 743.
98. See Imwinkelried, supra note 42, at 570 ("Jurors not only trust their own perception
and memory; they tend to trust the perception and memory of other lay witnesses as well.")
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a witness who is certain of her identification. Testimony about the
battered wife syndrome rarely will be crucial unless an eyewitness
has testified for the prosecution in a manner that eliminates any
overtly threatening circumstances. 99 The experts rarely will have
all the data that the eyewitnesses have and often will have gath-
ered the information they do have through means that seem less
trustworthy. 00 Experts testifying about general insights into per-
ception gather information through experiments. The design of the
experiments themselves, however, often will seem inapplicable to
the eyewitness testimony. The familiar method of staging a crime
in a classroom, for example, often leads to a demonstration of the
frequency of misidentification, but not necessarily to the conclu-
sion that a group of students in a classroom is as observant as an
individual police officer in a particular situation.10 1 Jurors under-
standably may prefer the testimony of eyewitnesses to the contra-
dicted conclusions of experts presented by partisans.
The expert witness also must face cross-examination. If he has
testified about a highly technical subject yielding a numerical re-
sult, he may feel some sense of security.102 Trial lawyers, perhaps
because of an accurate assessment of the inadequacies of their own
training, are notoriously reluctant to incur the risks involved in
challenging such an expert.10 3 A trial judge analyzing the probable
(citations omitted); Note, supra note 5, at 970 & n.7.
99. See, e.g., supra note 20 and cases cited therein.
100. See Note, supra note 22, at 420.
101. Counsel counteracting expert testimony inevitably will attempt to separate the spe-
cific situation at issue in the trial from the general findings about perception, memory, and
testimony that the experts provide. That process can be expected to consume a significant
amount of time if, for example, the prosecutor attempts to distinguish his case from the
general proposition that stress impedes perception or if the defense lawyer tries to distin-
guish his case from the popular conception that stress enhances perception. This mode of
attack has the advantage of being one with which most experienced trial lawyers are
familiar.
102. See Imwinkelried, supra note 15, at 272-73.
103. See generally A. AmSTERAM, B. SEGAL & M. MILLER, TRIAL MANUAL 3 FOR THE DE-
FENSE OF CRIMINAL CASES § 378 (3d ed. 1974).
Cross-examining an expert witness is ordinarily a difficult and risky business.
Most experts who testify are also expert testifiers, and counsel who attacks
them needlessly does so at the peril of being made to look like a knave or a
fool-both appearances proving, frequently, far more harmful to the defend-
ant's case than is the substance of the expert's testimony.
Id. at 1-376.
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weight that a jury will give to expert testimony about the psychol-
ogy of normal life, however, cannot assume that such evidence will
draw the same perfunctory challenge as chemical test results.
From a tactical point of view, cross-examination is a question of
balancing the risk that a contemplated question will impose an un-
desirable cost on the examiner against the benefits that may accrue
from a desirable admission.10 4 There is no reason to cross-examine
an expert on the psychology of normal life unless the direct testi-
mony has called into question the jurors' existing confidence in
their own understanding. When cross-examination is necessary, the
counterintuitive aspects of the expert's testimony provide the ex-
aming lawyer with an added margin of safety.105 The prospect of
an unexpected answer from a chemist may deter a questioner be-
cause the answer will be the only information the jurors have on
the subject. If common sense can contradict even the most damag-
ing answer an expert can give, however, counsel will be encouraged
to probe.
The likelihood of a vigorous challenge also can be increased if
the trial judge gives full scope to the rules requiring notice and
discovery of expert witnesses. The inflated worth of an expert's
testimony resulting from the expert's prestige may not justify an
assault on his testimony if a significant risk exists that counsel will
provoke an unanticipated and devasting response during the at-
tack. Full discovery often will remove that risk,' °0 and permit a
more informed and effective cross-examination. The effectiveness
of cross-examination also will be determined to some extent by the
availability to the lawyer of training materials suggesting effective
approaches. These vary from subject to subject, however, and the
various software techniques have drawn a substantial body of tac-
104. See Bergman, A Practical Approach to Cross-Examination: Safety First, 25 UCLA
L. REv. 547, 549 (1978).
105. Id. at 563-71.
106. See Giannelli, supra note 2, at 1240-42. Explicit rules requiring notice are not com-
mon in criminal contexts. But see FED. R. Cm. P. 12.2 (insanity); FmD. R. Evm. 412(c)(1).
Moreover, unfair surprise has lost much of its force as a grounds for exclusion. 1 J. WFE-
STEIN & M. BERGER, supra note 1, 1403[06], at 403-60. Nevertheless, a court with the power
to exclude prejudicial evidence has, in practical terms, the power to insist on ameliorative
steps as a condition for admission. See generally Berens, Pretrial Challenges to Expert
Testimony, LGATION, Summer 1982, at 27.
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tical commentary. 10 7 A final consideration suggesting that opposing
counsel can be expected to dispel the aura of expertise is the con-
sensus that an attack on an expert is unlikely to utterly destroy
the witness. Rather, the advocate will succeed if he merely neutral-
izes the expert's testimony.108
VI. CONVEYING THE PSYCHOLOGIST'S INFORMATION BY ALTERNATIVE
MEANS
A lawyer who complains that his case has been crippled by the
exclusion of expert testimony about the psychology of normal life
can expect to be compared to the defendant who killed his parents
and sought mercy as an orphan. Trial lawyers often treat the ex-
pert witness as a quick fix for a difficult situation. 0 9 This tendency
results partly from professional preoccupation with questions of
admissibility, and yet contributes to that preoccupation. In any
event, this narrow view of the expert's usefulness often results in
the lawyer's failure to establish communication with the expert
and to absorb the expert's learning. In assessing the undesirable
effects of the exclusion of expert testimony, the fairest approach is
to put aside this mode of lawyering and to consider what might be
accomplished by a lawyer who has informed himself about the un-
derlying knowledge and who attempts to introduce that knowledge
into the trial through the tools and tactics of advocacy. If a consci-
entious trial lawyer can convey the idea behind the expert's evi-
dence without bringing the expert to the stand, the question of the
107. See, e.g., R. KCmoN, TRIAL TACTICS AND METHODS, 147-57 (1954); A. LEVIN & H.
CRAMER, PROBLEMS AND MATERIALS ON TRIAL ADVOCACY 129-57 (1968); J. ZISKIN, COPING
WITH PSYCHIATRIC AND PSYCHOLOGICAL TESTIMONY (3d ed. 1981 & Supp. 1983); Dawson,
Cross-Examination of the Expert Witness, 8 EMPL. REL. L.J. 294 (1982); Schmidt, Cross-
Examination of an Expert Witness, 13 ST. MARY'S L.J. 89 (1981); Walter, Using the Oppo-
nent's Expert to Prove Your Case, LITIGATON, Winter 1982, at 10; Weber, Attacking the
Expert Witness, 31 FED'N INS. COuNS. Q. 299 (1981).
108. See, e.g., Walter, supra note 107.
109. Cf. Fallis, Confronting the Expert Witness-The Prosecution Perspective, in SCIEN-
TiFIC AND EXPERT EVIDENCE 75 (E. Imwinkelried 2d ed. 1981) (discussing techniques for
cross-examining and discrediting expert witnesses); Jenner, Meeting Expert Testi-
mony-The Defense Perspective, in SCIENTIFIC AND EXPERT EVIDENCE 87 (E. Imwinkelried
2d ed. 1981) (discussing techniques for cross-examining and discrediting expert witnesses);
Parlour & Jones, Bridging the Lawyer-Clinician Communication Gap, 43 ALA. LAW. 141
(1982) (reviewing the use of expert witnesses); Younger, A Practical Approach to the Use of
Expert Testimony, 31 Citv. ST. L. REV. 1 (1982).
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prejudicial effects surrounding expert scientific evidence can be
avoided.
A. Voir Dire
The scope and extent of the voir dire examination of potential
jurors is entrusted to the discretion of the trial courts.110 Assuming
that proponents of expert testimony on the psychology of everyday
life are correct that jurors labor under serious misconceptions con-
cerning perception, memory, or expression, imaginative use of the
voir dire might be a vehicle for solving that problem without
resorting to expert testimony. If undesirable jurors are stricken,
their misconceptions are no longer a concern; if they can be edu-
cated during the voir dire, their misconceptions have been cor-
rected without scientific evidence.
Broad claims have been made that the voir dire is a means of
rooting out jurors with disadvantageous preconceptions.1 In the
memoirs of legendary litigators, the claims often rest on particu-
larly arcane manipulations of racial, ethnic, and religious stereo-
types. In the more sober literature of modern social scientists, the
fundamental method for evaluating jurors continues to involve
stereotyping, but the definitions of the groups and the identifica-
tion of the individuals are produced by more sophisticated
means.11 2 Where Clarence Darrow was guided by the rule "no
Germans", a well informed lawyer now may seek jurors with be-
liefs, attitudes, or values similar to the defendant's. A substantial
collection of written material is available to guide this search.11 3 In
110. Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87, 138-40 (1974). See generally Babcock, Voir
Dire: Preserving "Its Wonderful Power", 27 STAN. L. REv. 545 (1975); W. MATRES & E.
DEvrrT, FEDERAL JURY PRACTICE AND INSTRUCTIONS § 2.01 (1965); Note, The Limitations on
Voir Dire Examination of Jurors in Criminal Prosecutions, 1950 WASH. U.L.Q. 381; Com-
ment, Court Control Over the Voir Dire Examination of Prospective Jurors, 15 DE PAUL L.
REV. 107 (1965).
111. See generally GINGER, JURY SELECTION IN CRIMINAL TRIALs-NEw TECHNIQUES AND
CONCEPTS §§ 7.3-.18 (1980); NATIONAL JURY PROJECT, JURYwoR: SYSTEMATIC TECHNIQUES
(2d ed. 1983); Field, Voir Dire Examination-A Neglected Art, 33 U. Mo. K.C.L. REv. 171
(1965); McConahay, Mullin & Frederick, The Uses of Social Science in Trials with Political
and Racial Overtones: The Trial of Joan Little, 41 LAw & CoNrEMP. PNoBs. 205 (1977).
112. See NATIONAL JURY PROJECT, supra note 111, at 195-211.
113. See, e.g., id.; Solender & Solender, Minimizing the Effect of the Unattractive Client
on the Jury: A Study of the Interaction of Physical Appearance with Assertions and Self-
Experience References, 5 Hum. RTS. 201 (1976); Wasserman & Robinson, Extra-Legal In-
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extraordinary cases, the social scientists themselves can guide
counsel toward desirable personality traits"14 and help him inter-
pret the panel's responses for clues indicative of those traits."5
To the extent that a trend is discernible, however, it is away
from extensive voir dire. In federal courts, individual, lawyer-con-
ducted voir dire has virtually disappeared." 6 Any attempt to solve
the problem of jury preconceptions during voir dire will affect ad-
versely the time savings achieved by this practice. If the precon-
ceptions that one might want to identify do not lend themselves to
easily phrased voir dire questions, a direct question may be neces-
sary. Counsel must decide whether to show his hand by asking di-
rectly: "Do any of you believe that memory for faces does diminish
very quickly?" or "Do any of you believe that a woman who was
really fearful would not have left her husband?"
The clarity of the questions and the answers, however, has obvi-
ous consequences in an adversary context. They will rarely lead to
a successful challenge for cause, but will often convince the oppos-
ing counsel that the juror whose misconceptions have been identi-
fied is exactly the type of juror the opponent seeks." 7 If the mis-
conception is material, its preservation will be as much in one
party's interest as its elimination is in the other's. Unless scientific
misconceptions are unevenly distributed across the jury pool, the
likely result is an evenly divided group of jurors holding opposing
views of the same issue.
Even that hope, however, can be sustained only in the abstract.
Practically speaking, each of the lawyers selecting jurors will have
an extremely complex agenda operating during voir dire. Each at-
torney will try to find a basis for a challenge for cause, make a
record, convey central legal principles, disarm surprising or damag-
fluences, Group Processes and Jury Decision-Making: A Psychological Perspective, 12 N.C.
CzNT. L.J. 96 (1980).
114. See, e.g., McConahay, Mullin & Frederick, supra note 111, at 218; Note, Forensic
Sociology and Psychology: New Tools for the Criminal Defense Attorney, 12 TULSA L.J.
274, 278-81 (1976).
115. See, e.g., Suggs & Sales, Using Communication Cues to Evaluate Prospective Jurors
During the Voir Dire, 20 Aiz. L. Rpv. 629 (1978).
116. See The Jury System in the Federal Courts, 26 F.R.D. 409, 466 (1960).
117. See Kaplan, Klein & Freid, General Aims of Prosecution Versus Defense in Selec-
tion and Influence of Jurors in a Criminal Trial, A Brief Working Model, 21 J. Soc. &
BHu v. Sci. 69 (1975).
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ing evidence that he expects the other side to offer, and establish a
good relationship with the jurors.118 Even if the jury selection task
involved nothing more complex than the selection of favorable ju-
rors, psychological misconceptions only rarely will be foremost in
the lawyer's mind, and the use of the information will always be
subject to competing considerations.
B. The Examination of Witnesses
Our adversary system places great emphasis on cross-examina-
tion, "the greatest legal engine ever invented for the discovery of
truth."1 Many decisions dealing with expert testimony about the
psychology of everyday life demonstrate hostility towards these of-
fers of proof, viewing the offers as efforts by trial lawyers to shirk
their duties as operators of the great engine. 20 The leading opinion
upholding the exclusion of expert testimony about the effect of
stress on perception notes that "effective cross-examination is ade-
quate to reveal any inconsistencies or deficiencies in eyewitness
testimony.212
A lawyer informed about the psychology of normal life should be
able to generate much of the specific data that a psychologist
would consider significant during the course of a trial. In this man-
ner, psychological expertise differs from other fields of scientific
evidence in which specific data-such as the alcohol content of
blood-cannot be obtained, much less conveyed, without resort to
scientific techniques. 22
In the "human factors" case of Seaboard Coast Line Railroad v.
Buchman,'2" counsel could have shown without resorting to expert
testimony that the railroad crossing had a slight incline, that or-
ange trees restricted the view of the tracks, and that multiple in-
118. See A. AMSTERDAM, B. SEGAL & MK MILLER, supra note 103, § 335.
119. 5 J. WIGMORE, supra note 2, § 1367 (J. Chadbourn rev. ed. 1974).
120. See, e.g., United States v. Amaral, 488 F.2d 1148 (9th Cir. 1973); Smith v. United
States, 389 A.2d 1356 (D.C. 1978); State v. Warren, 230 Kan. 385, 635 P.2d 1236 (1981);
State v. Porraro, 121 R.I. 882, 404 A.2d 465 (1979).
121. United States v. Amaral, 488 F.2d at 1153.
122. See Strong, supra note 2, at 2-4.
123. 358 So. 2d 836, 840-42 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978), rev'd, 381 So. 2d 229, 230 (Fla.
1980) (trial judge has discretion to admit expert testimony to assist jurors when unusual
circumstances might affect human response).
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tersections of highways and rail crossings existed. In the "battered
wife" case of Ibn-Tamas v. United States,124 counsel did not have
to rely on expert testimony to prove that the decedent's relation-
ship with his wife had been marked by periodic violent episodes. In
the eyewitness cases as well, the various factors that psychologists
believe have a detrimental impact on reliable identifications ordi-
narily can be elicited through competent cross-examination of the
eyewitness.1 25 The ability to convey specific data, however, is only
the beginning of the factfinding process. The jury must interpret
those facts by applying general principles to specific data. The effi-
cacy of the trial process in supplying these general propositions is
not so consistent.
The eyewitness identification process illustrates the problems
encountered during trial. A growing body of scientific literature
suggests that however successful the trial lawyer may be in uncov-
ering specific data tending to prove the stress and violence inher-
ent in a criminal episode, jurors will interpret the data by applying
the misconceived notion that stress enhances the reliability of
identification. 126 Moreover, psychologists' findings suggest that the
more vigorously counsel attacks the eyewitness on cross-examina-
tion, the more trouble he creates for himself. During his attack on
an eyewitness, counsel ordinarily will be confronting a witness who
is sincerely convinced of the accuracy of his identification. Exami-
nation of the witness probably will provoke the gestures, pauses,
and tones that amount to demeanor evidence. 27 Unfortunately,
the demeanor presented in these cases is a sincere, truth-telling
one. If the jurors subscribe to the generally held belief that a
truthful demeanor means a truthful and accurate witness,128 the
examiner may add to the jurors' faith in eyewitness testimony
rather than reveal its problems.
Unfortunately, the problem will not always resolve itself into
whether only specific data or general propositions are to be the
subject of the experts' offer. Even general misconceptions yield in
124. 407 A.2d 626 (D.C. 1979).
125. See, e.g., A. AMsTERDAM, B. SEGAL & M. MILER, supra note 103, § 374.
126. See supra note 19.
127. See Convis, supra note 19, at 588; Note, supra note 5, at 994-95.
128. See generally Miller & Burgoon, Factors Affecting Assessments of Witness Credibil-
ity, in THE PSYCHOLOGY OF THE CouRTRooM 169 (N. Kerr & R. Bray ed. 1982).
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different degrees to nonexpert evidence. For example, most jurors
are likely to believe initially that a woman who had reason to fear
great bodily harm from her husband would simply leave,1 29 and
that the occasion for justified, lethal, self-defense could not arise.
An advocate who has mastered the literature of psychology might
succeed in portraying the cyclical nature of the battering relation-
ship that ensnared his client.130 By doing so, he might succeed in
separating his case from the general principle, or might create a
subrule, which would permit accurate factfinding without resort to
expert testimony.
The traditional ammunition of the cross-examiner, facts known
by the witness but not disclosed,131 rarely provides a means of cor-
recting a misconceived notion about the psychology of everyday
life. The specific data that cross-examination can provide represent
only the raw material of informed decisionmaking. The data must
be incorporated into a framework of information useful to the jury.
The closing argument historically has been regarded as the pri-
mary opportunity for integrating raw data.
C. Instructions and Argument
Jury instructions are settled before closing arguments begin, and
trial lawyers are taught to integrate the principles enunciated by
the trial judge into their own accounts of the evidence.1 3 2 Even in
jurisdictions that curtail trial judges' power to comment on the evi-
dence, closing arguments and jury instructions together can be a
powerful means of conveying the underlying sense of the experts'
testimony without incurring the various costs associated with ex-
pert testimony. Trial judges are encouraged to instruct the jury if
any evidence supports an instruction;133 the scope and extent of
the closing arguments similarly are within their discretion.'
Counsel trying to compensate for the exclusion of expert testimony
concerning the psychology of everyday life have a reasonable
129. See, e.g., Walker, Thyfault & Browne, supra note 20, at 5-6.
130. See id. at 9-10.
131. See Note, supra note 5, at 994.
132. See, e.g., A. AMSTERDAM, B. SEGAL & M. IniR, supra note 103, §§ 446-447.
133. See, e.g., Brooke v. United States, 385 F.2d 279, 284 (D.C. Cir. 1967).
134. See, e.g., United States v. Sawyer, 443 F.2d 712, 713 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
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amount of leeway in their search for alternative means of introduc-
ing the idea behind the expert's opinion.
Several courts have resorted to cautionary instructions as a sub-
stitute for expert testimony concerning the frailities of eyewitness
identifications." 5 At least one commentator proposes instructions
as a solution to the problem of jurors' disproportionate reliance on
eyewitness testimony.136 An examination of the nature of closing
arguments and jury instructions, however, suggests the difficulty of
generalizing about the efficacy of instructions and argument as
substitutes for expert testimony.
The model instruction provided in United States v. Telfaire,5 7
135. See, e.g., United States v. Telfaire, 469 F.2d 552 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (proposed model
instruction).
136. Note, Eyewitness Identification Testimony and the Need for Cautionary Jury In-
structions in Criminal Cases, 60 WASH. U.L.Q. 1387, 1390 (1983).
137. 469 F.2d at 558-59. The Telfaire instruction states, in part, that
[o]ne of the most important issues in this case is the identification of the de-
fendant as the perpetrator of the crime. The government has the burden of
providing [sic] identity, beyond a reasonable doubt. It is not essential that the
witness himself be free from doubt as to the correctness of his statement. How-
ever, you, the jury, must be satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt of the accu-
racy of the identification of the defendant before you may convict him. If you
are not convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was the per-
son who committed the crime, you must find the defendant not guilty.
Identification testimony is an expression of belief or impression by the wit-
ness. Its value depends on the opportunity the witness had to observe the of-
fender at the time of the offense and to make a reliable identification later.
In appraising the identification testimony of a witness, you should consider
the following:
(1) Are you convinced that the witness had the capacity and an adequate
opportunity to observe the offender?
Whether the witness had an adequate opportunity to observe the offender at
the time of the offense will be affected by such matters as how long or short a
time was available, how far or close the witness was, how good were lighting
conditions, whether the witness had had occasion to see or know the person in
the past.
[In general, a witness bases any identification he makes on his perception
through the use of his senses. Usually the witness identifies an offender by the
sense of sight-but this is not necessarily so, and he may use other senses.]*
(2) Are you satisfied that the identification made by the witness subsequent
to the offense was the product of his own recollection? You may take into ac-
count both the strength of the identification, and the circumstances under
which the identification was made.
If the identification by the witness may have been influenced by the circum-
stances under which the defendant was presented to him for identification, you
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an eyewitness identification decision, is sensitive to the dangers of
misidentification. The instruction nevertheless fails to meet the
concerns of the advocates of expert testimony. The instruction
urges jurors to focus on the factors that have an impact on identifi-
cation, including witness capacity, the opportunity to observe, the
circumstances under which the identification was made, the
strength of the identification and the delay before the identifica-
tion took place. No one would argue that the catalog is not a help-
ful directory of the factors that influence identifications. Unfortu-
nately, the instruction provides no guidance concerning the way in
which the factors affect the reliability of identification evidence.
The Telfaire instruction calls attention to specific, significant data
developed during the trial, but fails to supply the general proposi-
tions necessary to interpret the data.113
This disability may result from an overly restrictive view held by
should scrutinize the identification with great care. You may also consider the
length of time that lapsed between the occurrence of the crime and the next
opportunity of the witness to see defendant, as a factor bearing on the reliabil-
ity of the identification.
[You may also take into account that an identification made by picking the
defendant out of a group of similar individuals is generally more reliable than
one which results from the presentation of the defendant alone to the witness.]
[(3) You make [sic] take into account any occasions in which the witness
failed to make an identification of defendant, or make an identification that
was inconsistent with his identification at trial.]
(4) Finally, you must consider the credibility of each identification witness in
the same way as any other witness, consider whether he is truthful, and con-
sider whether he had the capacity and opportunity to make a reliable observa-
tion on the matter covered in this testimony.
I again emphasize that the burden of proof on the prosecutor extends to
every element of the crime charged, and this specifically includes the burden of
proving beyond a reasonable doubt the identity of the defendant as the perpe-
trator of the crime with which he stands charged. If after examining the testi-
mony, you have a reasonable doubt as to the accuracy of the identification, you
must find the defendant not guilty.
*Sentences in brackets ([]) to be used only if appropriate.
Id.
138. See Note, supra note 5, at 1004.
Because the real dangers inherent in eyewitness identifications are not obvious
to the lay juror, the cautionary instructions can be effective only if the judge
goes beyond calling the issue to the jury's attention. This would require judges
to go much further into actually commenting on the weight of the evidence
than courts in this country have felt comfortable with or are permitted to do.
Id. (citations omitted).
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the drafters of the Telfaire instruction of the material that might
appropriately be included in an instruction. 39 A broader view of
the role that instructions play in the trial would allow a court to
incorporate as legislative facts data which an expert could provide,
and also would allow the court to supply directly the necessary
general propositions.14 0 Courts also will take judicial notice of adju-
dicative facts that are either indisputable or easily verifiable. 4' If
such facts exist in the context of the psychology of everyday life,
they can be made a part of the charge to the jury. Unfortunately,
the psychology of everyday life is not characterized by these kind
of certainties. In any event, judicial notice is a peculiar solution to
the problem of experts' tendency to "usurp the function of a jury."
General propositions of everyday life that are matters of some de-
bate should be debated by the jurors. Straining the boundaries of
judicial notice would represent a significant readjustment in the
concept of the jury trial.
If that drastic step is avoided, the shape of the closing argu-
ments is dictated, to some extent, by the absence of expert testi-
mony. Conscientious counsel may have read and applied the psy-
chologists' writings to generate facts that previously would have
seemed insignificant. He may have succeeded, for example, in por-
traying the cycle of violence that is said to be characteristic of all
battering relationships. In arguing the significance of the facts,
however, counsel is bound by the evidence in the case.14 In some
cases, one counsel will argue that a truly fearful woman would
leave her husband while opposing counsel argues that she would
not. The jurors will decide these cases on the basis of their own
preconceptions, rather than on anything presented in court. The
exclusion of the expert's testimony in many of these cases, there-
fore, will have foreclosed the use of the idea behind the expert's
evidence.
139. Saltzburg, supra note 6, at 1059 & n.187.
140. Id.
141. FED. R. Evm. 201 & advisory committee note. See generally MCCORMICK, supra note
2, §§ 328-335; Strong, supra note 2, at 6-9 (discussing distinction between adjudicative and
legislative facts).
142. See, e.g., Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935).
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VII. SYSTEM-WIDE EFFECTS OF THE DECISION TO ADMIT EXPERT
TESTIMONY
Many courts can empathize with Justice Hays, who dissented
from the Arizona Supreme Court's finding of an abuse of discretion
in excluding expert psychological testimony about the eyewitness
identification process:
My concern here goes beyond the borders of this case. Once
we have opened the door to this sort of impeaching testimony,
what is to prevent experts from attacking any real or supposed
deficiency in every other mental faculty? The peculiar risk of
expert testimony with its scientific aura of trustworthiness and
the possibility of undue prejudice should be respected. I have
great reluctance to permit academia to take over the fact-finding
function of the jury. Although clothed in other guise, that will
be the practical effect. With little to distinguish this case from
the general rule against admitting expert testimony on eyewit-
ness identification, we are left with no guidelines to decide the
deluge of similar issues which are sure to result.143
For many, the existence of alternative means of controlling the
prejudicial effect of expert testimony within a case offers little sol-
ace. They believe that, even if potential control devices are availa-
ble, a realistic view of our system of litigation suggests that they
rarely will be used.144 Moreover, adding the costs of the control
devices to the costs of the newly admitted experts themselves may
cripple the court system. The number of cases in which testimony
about the psychology of everyday life might be material certainly
sharpens these concerns. 45
Opinions excluding expert psychological testimony about normal
life express doubts concerning the benefits that admission of the
143. State v. Chapple, 135 Ariz. 281, 300, 660 P.2d 1208, 1227 (1983) (Hays, J.,
dissenting).
144. Professor Inwinkelried notes the reluctance or inability of defense lawyers to attack
chemists' results in drug cases. Imwinkelried, supra note 15, at 272. Another commentator
notes that "a surprising number of novel techniques have gained admissibility without the
presentation of [opposing] defense expert testimony." Giannellii supra note 2, at 1243. See
generally H. KALvEN & H. ZmsEL, THE Ammuc~A Juay 139 (1966).
145. The number of eyewitness cases is self-evident. The number of battered woman
cases, or at least the incidence of repeated domestic violence from which the defense can be
derived, is also quite large. See generally Comment, supra note 20.
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evidence will bring. 4" An implicit fear of these multiplied costs,
however, may be the true foundation for judicial wariness. Expert
testimony regarding a variety of topics, after all, is admitted with
great regularity. The expert witnesses customarily admitted to tes-
tify are no less bedecked with degrees and honors than the psy-
chologists. Even the police officer discussing why apparently inno-
cent acts actually represent a criminal modus operandi has no less
of an opportunity to project an aura. The existing tools of adver-
sary presentation generally are deemed adequate to control the
prejudicial effect of such testimony. 147
The prejudice is also considered to be manageable in many cases
involving the subject of perception, memory, and expression when
the phenomena described are in some respect abnormal or decep-
tive.1 8 Courts have admitted extrinsic, expert testimony when a
psychiatrist was willing to describe a witness as a pathological
liar. 49 Courts also have permitted expert testimony describing the
effect on perception and memory of states induced by organic
damage,' 50 by drugs, or by alcohol."1 In the Florida courts, where
human factors testimony has been most extensively litigated, 2 the
criterion for admissibility is the existence of extraordinary 53
circumstances.
One virtue of the abnormal and the extraordinary is that, by def-
inition, they occur infrequently. This infrequency necessarily limits
the number of trials in which scientific testimony will be offered.
146. See, e.g., St. Louis Southwestern Ry. v. Jackson, 242 Ark. 858, 871-72, 416 S.W.2d
273, 281 (1967) (human factors); Dyas v. United States, 376 A.2d 827 (D.C. 1977) (eyewit-
ness identification); State v. Thomas, 66 Ohio St. 2d 518, 521-22, 423 N.E.2d 137, 140 (1981)
(battered wife).
147. See generally J. WEISTEN & M. BERGER, supra note 1, 702[02] (discussing the
requirement of rule 702 of the Federal Rules of Evidence that expert testimony assist the
trier of fact).
148. See United States v. Hiss, 88 F. Supp. 559 (S.D.N.Y. 1950), aff'd on other grounds,
185 F.2d 822 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 948 (1951); Convis, supra note 19, at 580-82;
Juviler, Psychiatric Opinions as to Credibility of Witnesses: A Suggested Approach, 48
CALn. L. Rlv. 648, 650-56 (1960).
149. 88 F. Supp. at 559-60.
150. See Jones v. State, 232 Ga. 762, 765, 208 S.E.2d 850, 853 (1974).
151. See Fries v. Berberich, 177 S.W.2d 640, 644 (Mo. Ct. App. 1944).
152. See generally Note, supra note 22, at 412-18.
153. See Seaboard Coast Line R.R. v. Kubalski, 323 So. 2d 32, 34 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1975).
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Opening the courtroom to this type of testimony, therefore, does
not pose a serious cost problem. Although the costs of opening a
new field of expert testimony are a legitimate concern, the factors
that generate the concern will not translate mechanically into a
useful formula for making a specific evidentiary decision.
The most obvious costs of a pattern of resort to a new field of
expert testimony are direct costs, such as lawyers' and judges'
time, and public funds.'" The symbol of these costs, invoked even
by sympathetic commentators is the "battle of experts." 155 This
battle does not always have to take place, and if it does, it does not
have to be an all-out war. Trial judges have considerable control
over the number of experts that a party can call and the amount of
time each expert will consume.1 56 By confining expert testimony to
general statements rather than allowing case-specific opinions, trial
judges may be able to forestall a battle altogether.1 57 Liberal appli-
cation of the learned treatise rule may facilitate effective chal-
lenges to expert testimony without necessitating a parade.5 8 Trial
judges should not overlook the possibility that expert testimony
actually may prove less costly than alternative means of conveying
the same information.1 5 9
Direct cost, however, is only one type of cost, and the more
thoughtful critics of expert testimony about the psychology of eve-
ryday life do not base their arguments on direct cost alone. They
suggest instead that additional direct costs are not offset by a cor-
responding decrease in error costs,16 0 which are "the product of
two factors, the probability of error and the cost if an error oc-
154. See Posner, An Economic Approach to Legal Procedure and Judicial Administra-
tion, 2 J. LEGAL STn. 399 (1973).
155. See, e.g., Kaplan, Forward, in E. LoFiUs, supra note 19, at ix.
156. See, e.g., Salem v. United States Lines, 370 U.S. 31 (1962). See generally J. WEIN-
STEIN & M. BERGER, supra note 1, 702[02].
157. See J. WmNsTm & M. BERGER, supra note 1, 702[05].
158. See supra note 97.
159. In United States v. Hearst, 412 F. Supp. 893 (N.D. Cal. 1976), aff'd, 563 F.2d 1331
(9th Cir. 1977), for example, expert testimony concerning "stylistics" was excluded on a
variety of grounds. The accepted practice of comparing documents with known samples to
prove authorship, however, arguably achieves the same result by more laborious means. See
2 J. WIGMORE, supra note 2, § 383 (J. Chadbourn rev. ed. 1979).
160. See, e.g., Saltzburg, supra note 6, at 1058-60; Note, supra note 136, at 1425 ("For
present purposes, however, the most serious objection is that expert psychological testimony
overemphasizes the unreliability of eyewitness identifications") (citations omitted).
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curs."' This perception appears to be based partly on pessimism
concerning the quality of trial advocacy. Lawyers may be unable to
use the tools provided to challenge scientific experts, and the aura
of expertise actually may enhance the likelihood of error. 62 Even
commentators who are willing to posit lawyer competence are
alarmed by an uneven distribution of resources, particularly in the
prosecution of indigent criminal defendants, which may render the
presentation of scientific evidence so one-sided as to increase the
chance of error.163
Many of these observations have merit. Lawyer incompetence is
the topic of much discussion and cannot be ignored. Recognizing
that incompetence exists, however, does not provide a reason for
excluding helpful evidence in cases where incompetence does not
exist. Similarly, the entirely plausible prediction that many crimi-
nal defendants will be provided with lawyers who will be ignorant
of their opportunity to offer psychological experts does not neces-
sarily explain why such testimony should be unavailable to defen-
dants whose lawyers are better informed.1"
Because the contribution of scientific evidence to reducing the
probability of error cannot be judged except after the detailed ad
hoc analysis suggested earlier, 6 5 the question remains whether sys-
temic criteria are available for assessing the cost of error when it
occurs. An obvious example is the policy against any increased
probability of error in criminal prosecutions, an abhorrence re-
flected in the enhanced burden of proof borne by the prosecu-
tion.166 A framework has been suggested that would allow for an
expression of the intolerance for error in criminal cases concerning
161. Posner, supra note 154, at 401.
162. Cf. Imwinkelried, supra note 15, at 272 (noting reluctance and lack of training of
lawyers to attack scientific evidence).
163. See, e.g., Giannelli, supra note 2, at 1243-44.
164. Professor Saltzburg does anticipate that when psychological testimony about the
eyewitness identification process is admitted, "its absence in any case may result in disap-
pointed juror expectations and negative inferences." Saltzburg, supra note 6, at 1059. This
may be true if expert testimony is understood to consist of opinions about the reliability of
specific witnesses. It is difficult to see, however, how jurors will expect testimony about their
misconceptions concerning identifications while simultaneously entertaining the mis-
conceptions.
165. See supra notes 1-5 and accompanying text.
166. See Saltzburg, Standards of Proof and Preliminary Questions of Fact, 27 STAN. L.
REv. 271, 282-85 (1975).
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the admissibility of expert scientific evidence. Building on Profes-
sor Saltzburg's persuasive statement of the reasons for adjusting
the standard of proof for preliminary fact questions to suit the
particular fact question at issue,16 7 Professor Giannelli has sug-
gested that the prosecution should be required to establish the va-
lidity of a novel scientific technique beyond a reasonable doubt;
criminal defendants and civil litigants would need to demonstrate
validity only by a preponderance of the evidence.6 8 Several courts
have used due process169 and compulsory process'7" rationales to
buttress the admissibility of novel scientific evidence, such as poly-
graph results.
Any prejudice to the administration of justice that may result
from the time consumed by expert testimony must be considered
in light of the effect the testimony may have in reducing the
probability of error, and in light of the cost of error if it should
occur.171 This consideration can begin, but cannot be completed
without examining the facts of the particular case-not as they
seem before the trial begins, but as they can be expected to appear
at the end of the trial process.
VIII. CONCLUSION
When the dust from the battle over the Frye test has settled, a
single method for assessing the reliability and validity of scientific
evidence may appear. Undoubtedly, a single approach-whether
liberal or restrictive-would ameliorate the recurring problem of
ensuring that evidence drawn from scientific fields in which judges
have no personal knowledge has initial worth. Once that test has
been applied, however, courts then must gauge the potential
prejudice resulting from the decision to admit or exclude the
167. Id. at 304.
168. Giannelli, supra note 2, at 1248.
169. State v. Dorsey, 88 N.M. 184, 185, 539 P.2d 204, 205 (1975); Cullin v. State, 565 P.2d
445, 456-58 (Wyo. 1977); see also Note, Admission of Polygraph Results: A Due Process
Perspective, 55 In. L.J. 157 (1979).
170. State v. Sims, 52 Ohio Misc. 31, 369 N.E.2d 24 (1977); see also Imwinkelried, supra
note 15, at 267. See generally Westen, The Compulsory Process Clause, 73 MhCH. L. REV.
71 (1974).
171. Cf. Posner, supra note 154, at 401 ("The economic goal is thus to minimize the sum
of error and direct costs.") (emphasis added).
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evidence.
A uniform approach to the problem of prejudice in all scientific
evidence has many attractions. Unfortunately, the prejudice inher-
ent in a particular offer of scientific proof may be very different
from the prejudice inherent in other offers of scientific proof. Even
the most widely perceived source of prejudice, "[a]n exaggerated
popular opinion of the accuracy of a particular technique," will dif-
fer in its original extent, and differ in the degree to which it can be
expected to yield to adversary challenge. The efficacy of alternative
means of conveying the idea behind the evidence also will differ
from case to case. Development of an habitual drift away from a
practice of rigorous, ad hoc analysis and toward one of assuming
that the prejudicial properties of all scientific evidence are alike
actually will impede effective decisionmaking. An analysis of the
mechanics of the trial process suggests that, in some cases, the
aura of expertise can be controlled effectively. This control is es-
sential in cases requiring information that cannot be conveyed.ef-
fectively without scientific evidence. Detailed scrutiny of a particu-
lar offer of proof can reveal such a situation, and thereby enhance
accurate factfinding.
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